Posts Tagged ‘Futenma’

Summary of Okinawa Base News, April 22-28, 2018

April 29, 2018
Map of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa

Map of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa (from http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/25185.html)

From Monday through Saturday, hundreds gathered at the Camp Schwab gate in a mass sit-in to block Henoko base construction. US media completely ignored this six-day mobilization against construction of an American base. On day 1, Veterans for Peace members took part, and the crowd sang “We Shall Overcome”. On day 5, participants addressed the riot police who’d been sent to clear them away from the gate: “don’t lend support to construction that would crush Okinawa’s future!” We should all heed that message, as silence, too, is complicity.

Mainichi reports that a subcontractor providing waterborne security around the Henoko base construction site padded its bills by about 700 million yen (over $6 million). A whistleblower tipped off the Defense Ministry’s Okinawa Bureau about this malfeasance, but all they did was issue a verbal warning, ignoring rules stating that “contractors or subcontractors caught in ‘illicit or dishonest behavior’ are to be barred from bidding on ministry tenders for a set period.”
Well, not quite all. The Bureau also leaked the report by the whistleblower – including information that could be used to identify him – to the main contractor, and it eventually found its way to the subcontractor. When the Japanese state is imposing a new US military base on Okinawa, it lets nothing – not its own rules, not whistleblower protection standards – get in its way.

In the Okinawa City mayoral election, the government-backed incumbent won reelection, defeating a challenger supported by Governor Onaga and the (Henoko base-opposing) All-Okinawa Council. While base issues were peripheral to the campaign, this is not good news for the anti-base movement. Exasperatingly, “voter turnout was a record-low 47.27 percent.”

As Mainichi reports, the Okinawa Prefectural Government conducted a review of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) between the US military and host governments in Japan, Germany, and Italy. Examining such issues as whether the US military is subject to domestic law and whether local authorities are allowed to investigate US military aircraft accidents, the review found that Japan’s SOFA is far more heavily weighted toward the US side than the agreements with Germany and Italy. According to Professor Maedomari Hiromori of Okinawa International University, ”The governments of Germany and Italy have negotiated with the U.S. military keeping the need to guarantee their citizens’ safety and rights in mind. They are the polar opposite of the Japanese government, which remains silent.”

Shingetsu News Agency reports: “Abe government about to make a major financial payoff to Nago City for electing the ‘correct’ candidate in February elections. Subsidies were suspended in 2010 when the anti-base Susumu Inamine was elected. Now the central government will pay two years’ worth of subsidies.” Here we see state power being used to influence local elections.

“[B]ecause a warning light came on in one of them,” two US Marine Ospreys based at Futenma made emergency landings at an airport on Amami Island in Kagoshima prefecture.

The Japanese government is expected to start land reclamation for the Henoko base – i.e. pouring earth and sand into Oura Bay – as early as July. To prevent that, Governor Onaga would have to initiate the procedures for retraction of the previous governor’s reclamation approval by late May. Unfortunately, the governor has just had surgery to remove a tumor on his pancreas, and may be unable to return to his duties for over a month. Let’s all wish the governor a very speedy recovery.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Summary of Okinawa Base News, April 15-21, 2018

April 21, 2018
Map of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa

Map of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa (from http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/25185.html)

The Okinawa Times reported (Japanese) that in 2010, a Pentagon-commissioned expert team found that research conducted by the Defense Ministry’s Okinawa bureau for the Henoko base’s environmental impact assessment was “almost worthless”. Parties to the so-called dugong suit who are suing the Pentagon to cease construction of the Henoko base are likely to raise this matter in court.

A U.S. Marine UH-1 helicopter “experienced a maintenance issue” and, together with an AH-1, had an emergency landing. While the landing took place in Kumamoto Prefecture, both aircraft were based at Futenma Air Base in Ginowan, Okinawa.

Ryukyu Shimpo provided additional details (in English) on an issue mentioned in last week’s summary – namely, that a number of structures in the vicinity of the Henoko base site are higher than what is permitted under the U.S. military’s own regulations. Both civilian and military buildings exceed the safety limits, and among the latter is the Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot. You might think that the risk of aircraft colliding with an ammunition depot would be a major concern, but not to Japan’s Defense Ministry. “We are coordinating with the U.S. for height restriction exceptions to be made,” an official explains.

A new article appeared on an initiative by the Okinawa chapter of Veterans for Peace. VFP-ROCK wrote in March to Defense Secretary Mattis and other officials calling for immediate closure of Futenma due to its lack of clear zones at each end of the runway, as required by Navy safety standards. It being abundantly clear (as with the building height limits above) that the U.S. has no compunction about violating its own rules when Okinawan lives are at stake, VFP-ROCK hopes that emphasizing the danger to U.S. personnel will budge U.S. leaders out of their insistence on keeping Futenma open unless and until the Henoko base is complete. In so doing, the U.S. is using Futenma’s danger as a threat in a shameful attempt to compel Okinawa’s acceptance of the Henoko base.

The bromance between Prime Minister Abe and President Trump may be on the skids, but when they met at Mar-a-Lago, they still managed to croon their wretched duet: “The leaders reconfirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to the Camp Schwab/Henokosaki area and in adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.” See what I mean about the threat?

A major mobilization against Henoko base construction is planned for next week, with 400-500 people gathering at the Camp Schwab gate each day from April 23 through April 28. Organizers say: “with all urgency, we call on all Okinawans, citizens living in Japan and all over the world, to join this massive action outside the gate. Your support and assistance for our movement will be highly appreciated.”

Henoko: A Needless Military Base

April 18, 2018

This is an unedited version of an article that appeared several months ago on the Shingetsu News Agency website. With SNA’s permission, I’m posting it here, primarily because it includes links to sources.


Futenma Marine Corps Air Station in Ginowan, Okinawa must close – on that much everyone agrees. But the insistence by the United States and Japan on building a replacement facility in another part of Okinawa is bitterly opposed by Okinawa’s people and prefectural government. To dismiss their concerns, the State Department employs a boilerplate stating that moving to a new airfield offshore Camp Schwab in the Henoko district of Nago City “is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.” This assertion seems to satisfy most mainstream media in Japan and the U.S.; to my knowledge, the State Department has never been asked to defend it.

Futenma is home to Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36), which provides air transport for the ground troops of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) based at Camp Hansen, also in Okinawa. So to argue that it’s strategically indispensable that Futenma’s replacement be in Okinawa is to argue – at minimum – that the 31st MEU has a strategically critical mission that it could not perform if based anywhere else.

Proponents of the Marines’ presence in Okinawa swear that it hits a geographical sweet spot. As Marine Lieutenant General Lawrence Nicholson put it, “We have China, North Korea, Russia and the violent extremism that is occurring today in Mindanao of the Philippines. The location here, a couple hundred miles south of Japan puts us centrally located to be able to respond quickly.”

In support of such claims, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) produced the following map:

One could fault CRS’s selection of cities, but if proximity to Taipei, Beijing, Pyongyang, Seoul, and Tokyo is the standard, their combined distance from Okinawa is some 3610 nautical miles. Just by way of example, the combined distance to those cities from the Marine airbase in Iwakuni (Yamaguchi Prefecture) is 24 percent shorter. So one flaw in the “centrally located” argument is that it doesn’t necessarily point to Okinawa.

Numerous experts reject the notion that having Marines in Okinawa is strategically critical:

 

  • “There is nothing special about the geographical position of Okinawa.”
    (Former defense secretary William Perry)
  • “…although the U.S. Marine Corps’ presence in the region is extremely important, its particular location in the western Pacific is less critical, as long as training facilities and infrastructure are adequate.”
    (Eric Heginbotham, Ely Ratner, and Richard J. Samuels, writing in Foreign Affairs)
  • “Even if the Marine Corps left Okinawa, if the Air Force and the Navy were to stay in Kadena and mainland Japan, there would be no change in deterrence.”
    (Barry Posen, director of MIT’s Security Studies Program)

 

The 31st MEU, in particular, is the only one of seven MEUs to be based outside the United States. If the others can deploy from California or North Carolina, it’s unclear why the 31st cannot.

If Okinawa’s location is so crucial, shouldn’t the 31st MEU stay there, always at the ready for a regional military crisis? In fact, the unit deployed to Iraq from September 2004 to March 2005 and has engaged in natural disaster responses in Indonesia and Myanmar. Beyond such missions, the unit regularly spends roughly six months a year visiting countries like Australia for joint training exercises. So if a crisis on the Korean Peninsula breaks out, chances are it won’t even be in Okinawa.

Of the Marines’ air-ground task forces, MEUs are the smallest, with just 2,200 troops. In comparison, for example, to the 23,000 U.S. troops in South Korea, the 31st MEU’s size would limit its role in any contingency, except perhaps for one involving the Senkakus. And if they’re in Okinawa to defend Japan’s disputed control over uninhabited islets in the East China Sea, proponents should say so. As CRS notes, “The potential role of U.S. Marines in defending and/or retaking uninhabited islands from a hypothetical invasion force is unclear”. In any case, wouldn’t such a task fall more appropriately to Japan’s own version of the Marines, to be inaugurated in 2018? As for countering Chinese aggression more broadly, Posen avows that he “cannot see what role the Marine Corps might play in military actions that are likely to take place in the context of Japan-China or China-Taiwan relations.”

Providing air transport for a unit of minor strategic importance that needn’t be in Okinawa, Futenma is, as former ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost declares, not an essential base. Ultimately, explains (41:10) former Pentagon official Morton Halperin, no base is: “If you ask the military about any base which they now have, they will tell you ‘it is necessary.’” Instead, he says, “the question to ask is, what are the functions that you perform on the Marine base in Okinawa, and for each one of those functions, explain how you would do it next best if you lost the base on Okinawa…” As for Henoko, “I think we should have long since given up the notion of having a new Marine base on Okinawa, and paid whatever price – and I believe the price would be zero – but pay whatever price we have to pay in degradation or increased cost, to do the same function someplace else.”

With its colossal budget, the Pentagon can hardly plead poverty in rejecting alternatives, and it’s not as if none are available. In 2011, three U.S. senators, describing the Henoko plan as “unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable,” suggested moving Futenma’s assets to Kadena Air Force base, also in Okinawa. Akikazu Hashimoto and Mike Mochizuki propose that MAG-36 move to Kyushu or elsewhere in mainland Japan, transporting the 31st MEU out of a heliport inside Camp Schwab. Elements of these proposals might meet with objections in Okinawa, but Mochizuki and Hashimoto’s at least “avoids the negative environmental consequences of the landfill project” in Henoko’s Oura Bay. And while these proposals would leave the 31st MEU in Okinawa, a detailed recommendation from the Japanese think tank New Diplomacy Initiative goes further, urging that “just as the I MEF deploys an MEU from California across the Pacific and into the Indian Ocean, the 31st MEU could similarly be deployed from Hawaii or the continental U.S.”

In inserting the word “political” into its rationale for Henoko as the only way to close Futenma while addressing “operational, political, financial and strategic concerns,” the State Department inadvertently revealed the overriding consideration. Henoko indeed appeared to answer Tokyo and Washington’s political concerns. In 2014, Japan’s defense minister justified U.S. forces’ heavy concentration in Okinawa by saying, in Gavan McCormack’s paraphrase, “that no other district in Japan would have them.” The Abe administration fears the political fallout from a move to the mainland, and Washington is not about to undermine a conservative and compliant partner. Both governments assumed Okinawans would buckle and accept another base. They were wrong.

There’s a reason why Tokyo and Washington intone their “only solution” mantra: it serves to stifle a genuine debate over Futenma’s strategic value. For if Americans and Japanese started to question why we’re imposing a base on Okinawa for no appreciable gain in security, their governments might be forced to admit that the Henoko relocation is no solution at all.

The “Only Solution” Mantra

April 17, 2016

Last week, Japan’s Foreign Minister Kishida told Secretary of State Kerry that building a new airbase at Henoko in Okinawa is the “only solution” to closing the Futenma base while maintaining essential security functions. Kerry implicitly agreed. This ritual is repeated virtually every time American and Japanese officials meet. Do they think that by endlessly repeating this mantra, people will believe it?

The trouble, as Peter Ennis puts it, is that “MCAS Futenma is convenient for training and Marine down time, but has no strategic function.” Ennis is no peacenik; he makes this point precisely because he sees the unwillingness to reconsider the Henoko base as a threat to core priorities of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Moreover, in an unguarded moment, former Minister of Defense Morimoto stated that “from a military perspective, the relocation does not have to be in Okinawa.”

Another crack in the facade appeared when Michael Armacost, a former ambassador to Japan, declared that “Futenma is not an essential base”, and cast doubt on the merits of transferring it to Henoko.

Anyone open to facts and logic can see that Kerry and Kishida’s claim that Henoko is the “only solution” is nonsense. The point of their dog and pony show is not to persuade, but to send the message that they will never budge. But the Okinawan people have held off this base for 20 years, and if we stand with them, even mantra-intoning officials will one day be enlightened.

In Okinawa, Discrimination Has a Number

October 14, 2015

I’m going to go through a bit of arithmetic here, but it’s in the interest of answering an important question: just how unfair a burden of American military bases is imposed on Okinawa? If you’re math-averse, you can skip over it.

Opponents of the transfer and expansion of a U.S. Marine base from Futenma to the Henoko district of Nago City in Okinawa often cite the fact that Okinawa, with just 0.6% of Japan’s total area, accounts for 73.8% of the U.S. base presence in Japan (that is, the combined area of bases used exclusively by the U.S. military in Japan). These two figures, 0.6 and 73.8, testify to the unfair burden imposed on Okinawa for what is supposedly a benefit to Japan as a whole.

map_en
Map of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa (from http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/25185.html)

But just how unfair? The burden military bases place on a region depends both on their combined area and on the region’s size. The greater the area, the greater the burden. The larger the region, the smaller the burden. So to measure the burden, we can use the density of bases per unit area.

Now, if the American base presence were distributed evenly throughout Japan, the base density in Okinawa would be the same as the density in the rest of Japan (for which I’ll use the imperfect term “mainland”). As a measure of the density in Okinawa, we can use the ratio of 73.8 and 0.6, which is 123. How about mainland Japan? First, the percentage of bases it hosts is 100 – 73.8, or 26.2%. Second, the mainland‘s percentage of Japan’s total area is 100 – 0.6, or 99.4%. To get the density of bases in mainland Japan we take the ratio of 26.2 and 99.4, and get about 0.2636.

Now, 123 is about 467 times 0.2636. So instead of equal densities, we find that Okinawa’s is 467 times that of mainland Japan. That is how unfair the burden of the American military presence is on Okinawa: almost 500 times the burden on the rest of Japan.

The central government in Tokyo evidently considers the level of base concentration on the mainland appropriate. But it rigidly opposes any action that would significantly reduce a burden on Okinawa 467 times that level. It’s as if Japan concentrated nuclear power stations 467 times as densely in Okinawa as it did everywhere else. Can anyone deny that this is a gross injustice?

The Pentagon claims that the Henoko base is part of a realignment intended to reduce the burden on Okinawa. But “burden” is too vague; by focusing instead on relative base densities, we can advance the debate. At the end of this realignment, bases will still be concentrated in Okinawa hundreds of times more densely than they are in the rest of Japan. Calling that a reduction in burden is an insult. Much, much more is needed – beginning with the abandonment of plans for the Henoko base.

[This article has been revised to improve clarity.]